Was the question of recognition of Croatia, in the autumn of 1991 in Germany, “immature”, and was Stjepan Mesić, incognito and unknown to anybody in Croatia, visiting Genscher?
The international recognition of Croatia is a topic that is covered in the media space. On 5 June 2021, an
interview with the former President of the Republic of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić, was published, in which, in relation to the international recognition of Croatia, there are two claims that are subject to verification [1]. Text is translated from Croatian language.
Claims to be verified:
1. In the autumn of 1991, the international recognition of Croatia had not yet matured in Germany, neither with Genscher nor with Kohl.
2. Stjepan Mesić's meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher was incognito and no one in Croatia was told about it in advance.
Note
Since the part "not mature" in the first statement is not specified, this analysis examines whether the German political leadership considered the recognition of Croatia as a realistic option in the autumn of 1991 and whether it communicated with key partners about it. In the second claim, it is not important whether the meeting was held, but whether the departure for the meeting was unknown in Croatia, including the Croatian state leadership, or whether there was a prior announcement of the departure.
The part of the interview that contains the claims that are being verified:
But it was not so easy to secure international recognition. Do you know this firsthand?
After all those talks I had in Belgrade, it was clear to me that Yugoslavia could not be maintained. That is why it was necessary to fight for independence. That was the only way out. My friend Božo Dimnik, a businessman from Ljubljana, mentioned to me in a conversation in 1991 that he had good relations with the German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and that he had told him that the question of recognizing Croatia had not yet matured in Germany, neither with him nor with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. To this, I said that there was no longer a single integrative factor for the preservation of Yugoslavia, that everything had fallen apart and that now the only way out was to recognize the independence of Croatia. I asked my friend Dimnik if he could arrange a trip to Bonn for me and a meeting with Genscher. And so I went incognito to Germany, which only Janez Drnovšek knew about, who organized our passage through Slovenia.
Given that you went to Germany as the president of the Presidency of the SFRY, what would have happened if it had been revealed where you were going?
If they had caught me, it would have been high treason.
Were you aware of that?
No. I was only interested in having a conversation with Genscher.
And you didn't tell anyone in Croatia that you were going to that meeting?
To no one. I went there and counted on a 20-minute meeting with Genscher.
Analysis of the first claim: In the autumn of 1991, the international recognition of Croatia had not yet matured in Germany, neither with Genscher nor with Kohl.
According to
the statements of Božo Dimnik, the alleged meeting between Mesić and Genscher took place on November 14, 1991. It was arranged in October 1991 after the rocket attack on Banski Dvori [2]. However, the available documentation from September and the beginning of November 1991 shows that the issue of international recognition of Croatia was already the subject of discussion at the highest level and that recognition was considered as a possible outcome in official talks between the German and American political leadership.
The George Bush Presidential Library and Museum is one of the sources of authentic documents containing such content [3].
On 16 September 1991, a meeting was held between US President George W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, along with other senior state officials of both countries, where they discussed, among other things, the situation in Yugoslavia [4]. At one point, Bush told Kohl that he would like to hear his views on Yugoslavia. Kohl says that there are 700,000 Croats in Germany, that Germany has excellent relations with Yugoslavia, that the situation is terrible and that neither America nor Germany can offer a solution. The conversation raises problems in relations in Yugoslavia, and both the Germans and the Americans point out that Milosevic does not care about Yugoslavia because he wants a Greater Serbia and that he will let Slovenia and part of Croatia go because of that. Bush says Americans fear the recognition will trigger a civil war. They consider who is to blame for this situation, and Kohl says at the end of the conversation:
"If there is no dialogue and war starts to rage, the recognition of sovereignty will become an inevitable consequence."
On October 3, 1991, a meeting was held at the White House between U.S. President George W. Bush and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the presence of other senior government officials from both sides [5]. In the part of the conversation related to the events in Yugoslavia, Genscher said:
"We must offer negotiations looking towards the independence of these republics in order to give them the opportunity to leave, we should give them the right to leave, but only if they accept the responsibility to protect minority rights. I encouraged them in that direction. With such a possibility open to them, they can refrain from unilateral actions to achieve their independence. We must be given hope for achieving independence through negotiations. There is a strong public opinion that is gradually shifting in favour of Croatia and Germany. You have many Croats and Serbs living in Germany."
On November 7, 1991, a meeting was held in Rome between U.S. President George W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and other officials on both sides. At one point, Kohl says that "we should talk about Yugoslavia now" and asks Genscher to describe German positions. Genscher says that "they need to be clear with the facts" and explains: "What kind of solution is possible in Yugoslavia? We must recognize the borders as they are and we must guarantee minority rights. Any other ideas, such as the reassembly of Yugoslavia, are illusions." To this, Secretary of State James Baker asks: "So, I understand that you are talking about recognition. What is the difference between Canada's recognition of Ukraine and your recognition of Croatia?" Genscher explained his view to him, to which Baker replied that "we should be very careful about confession." Then Kohl steps in and says, "This situation is turning. There is no doubt about it. Awards will have to be made by the end of the year. I think it's only fair that we be clear with you about that."
For additional verification of the claim in question, one can use the available Genscher interviews in which Genscher mentions the recognition of Croatia. For example, in 1992. Genscher stated that the war against Croatia raged until recognition followed, and that it came too late. Genscher says:
"Precisely because it would not turn out that we are conducting our own, independent foreign policy, which would undoubtedly be counterproductive, we did not insist on the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in August last year." [7]
In 2011. Genscher stated:
"In many countries, there were more and more votes in favour of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, then already retired, was in favour of it. In addition, there was strong support from the foreign ministers of Belgium and Denmark. The European Community has agreed to a two-month deadline for finding a solution set by the then president of the Council, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek. The deadline expired at the beginning of December. From 16 to 17 December, we had a session, the conclusion of which was that Slovenia and Croatia would be recognized on 15 January 1992. Germany complied with it" [8].
According to a 2007 interview with Dimnik, Genscher's lobbying for the recognition of Croatia is a consequence of Mesić's meeting with Genscher, which, according to Dimnik, was allegedly confirmed in Warren Zimmerman memoirs, the then US ambassador to Belgrade, who "wrote that no one understood such a transformation of the German head of diplomacy" [9].
However, a look at Zimmerman's memoirs shows that Zimmerman did not confirm this [10]. Moreover, he did not mention it at all. Zimmerman writes about Genscher and Croatia's recognition in two places. On p. 146 Zimmerman writes that Slovenia's argument that Slovenes had the same right to self-determination as Germans from the German Democratic Republic when they decided to join the Federal Republic of Germany may have been a key factor in German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's firm decision to rush with the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. On p. 176 Zimmerman writes that "during the autumn of 1991, German Foreign Minister Genscher pressed the European Community for early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia - exactly what Izetbegović feared the most."
Alija Izetbegovic (from Bosnia and Herzegovina, leader of Bosniaks) was against early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia because he feared it would provoke violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so with the help of Hansjörg Eiff, the German ambassador to Yugoslavia, he prepared to discuss it with Genscher. In the end, he failed to raise the issue, which led Genscher to assume that he had the green light from Izetbegović for the recognition. Zimmerman goes on to write that he asked the Americans to persuade the European Community to drop the recognition, but that while America shared the concerns, it did not do enough about it. Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington were also strongly opposed to the recognition, arguing that "there should be no Western recognition of the independence of any Yugoslav republic until everyone has agreed on their mutual relations" and that Vance told him on December 5: "My friend Genscher is out of control with this. What he is doing is madness." Zimmerman ends up writing that none of these complaints prevailed. Bowing to German pressure, the leaders of the European Community decided on December 17, 1991 to recognize Croatia and Slovenia and offer recognition to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Zimmerman does not mention Mesić at all in the context of Genscher's advocacy for the recognition of Croatia, but he writes that in June he "found a nice ear" in Stipe Mesić because Stipe Mesić said that Croatia and Slovenia may be moving too fast towards independence [11].
In the study German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia, author Daniele Conversi analyses how the German decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was made, and presents the position, referring to the views of other scientists, that it is a combination of pressure from the German public, pressure from politicians from all German parties in Bonn and the results of Serbian attacks on Croatia reported by the German media. Conversi said the recognition was also the result of a painstaking negotiation process in which Germany tried to avoid alienating other Western partners. Genscher also had the informal support of several governments, including the Hungarian and Austrian governments. Conversi also cite Germany's readiness to react because in other countries there was public support for recognition, even higher than in Germany, but Germany, unlike other countries, had the political desire and ability to adapt to changes [12].
It can be commented here that in 1998, when this study was published, the details of Mesić's conversation with Genscher were not known, because Mesić and Dimnik came out with it for the first time after that. However, the point is that Germany's advocacy for the recognition of Croatia was a complex political and diplomatic process that lasted several months, and not a sudden reversal and immediate consequence of Mesic's alleged conversation with Genscher. In addition, Genscher himself published his memoirs in 1995, which were published in Croatian in 1999 [13]. In them, Genscher does not mention the meeting with Stjepan Mesić, nor does he attribute any role to him in the process of recognizing Croatia, although in the book he refers in detail to the Yugoslav crisis and the decisions of 1991.
In a study published in 2017, historian Davor Marijan states that Germany has been preparing the ground for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia since the meeting in Rome on November 8, 1991, where NATO heads of state and foreign ministers also discussed measures related to the Yugoslav crisis. Marijan writes that "such a position did not meet with enthusiasm among some members of the European Community who insisted on a common approach", but that the media "greatly influenced the sensitization of the public, especially after the Serbian conquest of Vukovar" [14].
As for the direct participants in these events, there are several statements. Davorin Rudolf, who was the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, states that on the day of the declaration of independence, June 25, 1991, task number one in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the international legal recognition of Croatia and that it should start with Germany, with Genscher "carefully, carefully, on tiptoe!" [15]. Rudolf himself writes that "the reversal in German official policy towards Yugoslavia and Croatia occurred after the declaration of independence of Croatia at the end of June 1991 as a result of a new real situation – a new permanent structure of states – in Europe" [16].
Mate Granić, Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia in the second half of 1991, states that Genscher mentioned to him at a dinner in the Medvedgrad pub in Zagreb several important factors that influenced the change in German policy towards Croatia: "the open, aggressive policy of Slobodan Milošević, war crimes against civilians that were well documented by the German media, the communist essence of Milošević's regime, the pressure of the Croatian diaspora in Germany, the role of the Holy See and the attitudes of many German citizens who knew Croatia very well". Another factor was Germany's desire to "play a much more important political role after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of the country, which Great Britain and France had played up to that point" [17].
Franjo Gregurić, Prime Minister of the Government of Democratic Unity since August 1991, states that "the head of German diplomacy H. D. Genscher spoke on August 20 in Bonn with the foreign ministers of Croatia and Slovenia", "President Tuđman met on August 23 with US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman", who was received by Gregurić together with ministers Šeparović and Budiša. The next day, they learned that "the German Foreign Minister had informed the Yugoslav ambassador in Bonn that Germany would consider recognizing Croatia if the bloodshed continued" [18].
From the above sources, it is evident that the claim that in the autumn of 1991 the question of the recognition of Croatia had not yet matured in Germany, neither with Genscher nor with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It is evident that this issue has matured and that the Germans have informed the Americans about it. It is also evident that Germany had been thinking about recognition even before August 1991 and had not taken any independent action on the matter, but had waged a long-term political campaign in this regard in cooperation with other international actors.
Analysis of the second claim: Stjepan Mesić's meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher was incognito and no one in Croatia was told about it in advance.
In the interview, the claim explicitly refers to the fact that no person in Croatia was informed in advance to go to the meeting. Whether this was really the case can be seen in the minutes of the 36th session of the Supreme Council of State held on 12 November 1991 in Zagreb [19]. At that session, Mesić recounted his conversation with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti:
"But what's most important for us, he says like this. That Croatia's diplomacy was good. That it has used all opportunities to present Croatia in the most democratic light and that this is now our advantage. Yes, because of that, this is how he has now presented me with information, which I can only do to the President of the Republic, but I reckon that everyone here will not go anywhere until further notice, because it will be soon, it will no longer be a secret. Namely, Austria, Germany and Italy would go for a separate recognition of Croatia, if the European Community does not accept it. I have already arranged for him to see Genscher, which I would probably do tomorrow or the day after. I said that our President of the Republic is going to visit Kohl. He says, that's fine, but that it's not a bad idea to brief Genscher a little in this latest situation. What is dangerous for us ..."
To which President Tuđman replied:
"By the way, Genscher himself called me on Sunday afternoon and told me about it. "Genscher, isn't he?"
It is evident from these minutes that it is not true that Mesić went to the meeting with Genscher incognito and that he did not tell anyone in Croatia that he was going to that meeting. He mentioned going to the meeting at this session, and judging by the minutes, in addition to him and President Tuđman, the following were at the session: Gojko Šušak, Ivan Milas, Josip Manolić, Anton Tus, Žarko Domljan, Milan Ramljak, Perica Jurić, Branko Salaj, Antun Vrdoljak, Zdravko Tomac and Mate Granić. Therefore, it is not that he did not tell anyone in Croatia that he was going to that meeting, but he told at least twelve people. In addition, it is evident that President Tudjman was already familiar with Genscher's position from personal contact with him, as well as that he already had a meeting with Kohl.
There are also some inconsistencies within Mesić's and Dimnik's statements. Dimnik stated at least twice that the meeting took place on November 14, 1991, and once he stated that it was arranged in October 1991 [9]. In an
interview from 2018, Mesić places the conversation with Genscher in the end of summer or the beginning of autumn 1991 [20]. In each interview, Mesić and Dimnik state the estimated duration of the meeting differently: Mesić mentions 20 minutes in Večernji list in 2021, Mesić mentions 15 minutes for Radio Free Europe in 2018, Dimnik mentions 30 minutes in Nacional in 2007, Dimnik mentions 40 minutes for Deutsche Welle in 2017. They are consistent in a dwell time of 4 hours.
Conclusion
Based on the insight into the available documentation, minutes and interviews, it is concluded that both verified claims are false.
The claim that in the autumn of 1991 the international recognition of Croatia had not yet matured in Germany with either Hans-Dietrich Genscher or Helmut Kohl is not confirmed by an insight into the available diplomatic sources, interviews and historiographical research. In this analysis, the term "maturity" refers to the serious consideration of recognition as a likely policy option and the communication of this possibility with key international partners, which was documented before mid-November 1991.
The claim that no person in Croatia knew about the meeting in advance is in direct contradiction with the minutes of the 36th session of the Supreme Council of State of November 12, 1991, at which the departure for the meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher is mentioned in front of the highest state officials as a future event.
Sources
[1] Petra Maretić Žonja. Mesić: I was with Genscher at a secret meeting in 1991, he revealed to me what would happen to Croatia. Večernji list, 05/06/2021
[2] Andrea Jung-Grimm. Without Mesić, there would have been no independent Croatia 25 years ago. Deutsche Welle, 13/01/2017
[4] The White house, Washington, Memorandum of conversation. Subject: Expanded Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany. Date: 1991-09-16.[5] The White house, Washington, Memorandum of conversation. Subject: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany. Date: 10/3/1991
[6] The White house, Washington, Memorandum of conversation. Subject: NATO Summit. Date: 11/7/1991
[7] Branimir Baron Brljević. Hans Dietrich Genscher: Embargo on Serbia!tag. Globe No. 92, 11.9.1992.
[8] Genscher: "There is no question of a special role for Germany." Deutsche Welle according to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23/12/2011
[9] Robert Bajruši. Mesić's mysterious Slovenian friend. Nacional no. 615, 28.8.2007.
[10] Warren Zimmerman. Origins of a catastrophe, Times Books, 1999.
[11] Ibid., p. 132.
[12] Daniele Conversi. German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia, p. 19-24. Seattle: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 16), 1998. Available in the UW ResearchWorks repository (PDF).
[13] Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Memories, Zagreb : Croatian University Publishing House and Croatian Institute of History, 1999 (ed. Erinnerungen, Munich: Siedler Verlag, 1995).
[14] Davor Marijan. Croatia 1989 – 1992 The Birth of the State, Zagreb : Croatian Institute of History, 2017, p. 548-549.
[15] Ibid., p. 309.
[16] Davorin Rudolf. Creation of the Croatian state in 1991, Split : Školska knjiga i Književni krug, 2016., p. 366.
[17] Mate Granić: Diplomatic Storm, Zagreb: Večernji list d.o.o., 2019, p. 32-33.
[18] Franjo Gregurić. Government of Democratic Unity, Zagreb : Školska knjiga and Hanza Media, 2017, p. 74-75.
[19] Croatian State Archives, Minutes of the 36th Session of the Supreme State Council held on Tuesday, 12 November 1991.
Roman Domović