Is it true that NATO promised Russia in 1990 that it would not expand the alliance's membership to the East of the European continent?
For years, both in
the Croatian and international
information environment, the alleged promise of the NATO alliance made to Russia in 1990 that the NATO alliance would not expand towards the east of the European continent has been frequently mentioned. We will mention just a few:
It is necessary to check whether this claim is true or whether it is the result of constructions and a product of the spread of Russian and pro-Russian narratives that try to justify Russian aggression against Ukraine not only until 2022 but also from 2014.
On February 9, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker promised Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev: NATO would not expand eastward. The duo agreed that NATO would not expand to the territory of East Germany, and the same was repeated by the NATO Secretary General on May 17, 1990 in Brussels.
In 1990, NATO had 17 members, and today there are 30, including the Baltic states, several countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact.
These data need to be seen in the context of the processes and events on European soil at the end of the Cold War. Here are the key facts:
1.
At the beginning of March 1985, after the death of the former head of the Soviet Union and the Russian Communist Party, Yuri Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Realizing the gravity of the economic and social crisis in which the Soviet Union finds itself, and in the desire to solve this crisis, he initiated the processes of change known as
Glasnost (Openness) and
Perestroika (Reconstruction).
2.
In August 1989.
Hungary opens its border with Austria to the population.
3.
Late in the evening of the day
November 9, 1989 there were disagreements in the East German political leadership over the abolition of the consent for travel abroad that East Germans had to obtain before going on a trip, especially to Western Europe.
Günter Schabowski makes an ambiguous statement at the press conference. Residents of East Berlin, the capital of the then Democratic Republic of Germany (also known as East Germany), then head towards the border, arriving at the
The Berlin Wall heading to West Berlin near
Brandenburg Gate. The Berlin Wall has ceased to be a symbol of division. And the process of ending the Cold War was literally open.
4.
This act initiated the process of unification of the two German states. It must be said that this
Ostpolitik of the West German government has been achieved. That is, the policy of building a complex system of interrelations with East Germany in the function of its reintegration into the constitutional and legal order of West Germany.
5.
In May 1990. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany, at a 2+4 meeting to discuss German reunification (two Germanys and the four victorious powers from WWII: the United States, the UK, France and the Soviet Union), approves a loan to the Soviet Union in the amount of DM 5 billion in order to save the budget of the Soviet Union and the political future of Mikhail Gorbachev (and thus German reunification) at the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which was to be held in early July 1990 in Moscow.
At that 2+4 meeting, NATO allies offered to reform NATO's strategy of action, especially in relation to the Soviet Union. Gorbachev then agreed to the unification and entry of East Germany into the NATO alliance. A condition was also set that no other units of the NATO allied countries, except for the units of the armed forces of West Germany, and especially nuclear weapons, would be placed or deployed on the territory of East Germany. Germany has renounced the production and possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, limiting the number of Bundeswehr members to 370,000. This agreement was signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990.
6.
On October 3, 1990, the two German states were united. Thus, the former East Germany, without any conditions, only with the full guarantee given by the then German government under the leadership of Helmut Kohl, to its Western partners and allies, was admitted to both the European Community and NATO. This integration was the subject of numerous talks between various Soviet delegations on the one hand, and German and other delegations from the West at that time. Namely, even Western friends and allies (primarily
France and
the United Kingdom) did not look favorably on the process of reunification of the two German states. Therefore, Helmut Kohl had to be very careful in the process of unification so that this process would not be prevented or slowed down. This, among other things, led to support for Western policy in an attempt to preserve the then Yugoslavia under the leadership of Ante Marković. German policy only after unification, and faced with the war crimes of the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) in the aggression against Croatia (primarily the defense of Vukovar and Dubrovnik),
gradually changed its position and became more active in supporting the process of recognizing the right of the republics to self-determination until secession.
7.
On May 27, 1997, the
Charter of Cooperation between NATO and Russia was signed. The agreement mentioned a fundamental change, in a positive direction, in the development of relations between NATO and Russia in strengthening the security of the European continent.
Russia becomes part of NATO's Partnership for Peace program. A strategic partnership is being established. Russia no longer considers the NATO alliance to be adversary and will initiate processes of cooperation with NATO.
With this document, Russia recognizes the autonomous and sovereign right of designation of states in their decision-making process in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration, with an emphasis on this right of all states from the territory of Europe to conclude and enter into alliances.
At that time (1990), only the unification of the two German states and the expansion of the NATO alliance to the former territory of the former East Germany were discussed. No one has ever mentioned the expansion of NATO to the East in the sense of entering, for example, the expansion of NATO to Poland or the Baltic states in NATO, because at that time it was neither possible nor was there an expression of the will of the political leadership and the population of these countries to join the NATO alliance.
It is necessary to clarify the process by which a country can become an ally in NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty in
Article 10 clearly states the procedure by which one can become a member of the Alliance:
Article 10
The signatories may, by unanimous decision, invite any other European State that is able to promote the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the Treaty. Any invited state may become a signatory to the Treaty by attaching a candidacy for accession to the U.S. government. The U.S. Government will notify each of the signatories of any submitted candidacy.
Before that, the state must demonstrate a clear commitment to the principles, rules and beliefs that constitute the connective bonds of the NATO alliance. This commitment must be supported by both the majority in the legislature and the population. After the Alliance has invited a State to membership, that decision shall be unanimous by all the Allies as provided
in Article 11 of the Treaty:
This Treaty should be ratified and its provisions should be implemented in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the signatory countries. The candidacy for accession should be submitted as soon as possible to the U.S. Government, which will notify the other signatories of any attached candidacy. The Treaty should enter into force among the States that have ratified it as soon as a majority of the signatories, including Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have submitted their ratification, and the Treaty has entered into force on the date of the submission of ratification.
This means that no country enters NATO by force, nor is it persuaded or forced to become a member of the Alliance. States make these decisions independently, aware of the complexity of negotiations with the aim of satisfying the set conditions that they must meet.
The process of joining the Alliance is, as a rule, a multi-year process.
It is also necessary to mention the interviews that Mikhail Gorbachev gave to various media on the issue of the expansion of the NATO alliance to Eastern Europe.
In an interview given on October 16, 2014. Mikhail Gorbachev gave
RBTH the following explicitly:
RBTH: One of the key issues that has arisen in connection with the events in Ukraine is NATO expansion into the East. Do you get the feeling that your Western partners lied to you when they were developing their future plans in Eastern Europe? Why didn’t you insist that the promises made to you – particularly U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that NATO would not expand into the East – be legally encoded? I will quote Baker: “NATO will not move one inch further east.”
M.G.: The topic of “NATO expansion” was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a singe Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either. Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces from the alliance would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement, mentioned in your question, was made in that context. Kohl and [German Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich] Genscher talked about it.
Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled. The agreement on a final settlement with Germany said that no new military structures would be created in the eastern part of the country; no additional troops would be deployed; no weapons of mass destruction would be placed there. It has been observed all these years. So don’t portray Gorbachev and the then-Soviet authorities as naïve people who were wrapped around the West’s finger. If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object.
The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed.
On November 9, 2014,
an excerpt from a video interview of Mikhail Gorbachev given to
ZDF (from 00:50 to .01:05 minutes) was published on the website Zeit.de
The 1990 Two-plus-Four agreement applied to the territory of the GDR, Gorbachev said. Asked if it was a myth that the West betrayed him, Gorbachev replied: "Yes, it is indeed a myth. The press participated in it."
COUNTERARGUMENTS
What are the arguments of the side that claims the opposite, that is, that the NATO alliance has promised not to expand to the East:
Wir waren uns einig, dass nicht die Absicht besteht, das NATO-Verteidigungsgebiet auszudehnen nach Osten. Das gilt übrigens nicht nur in Bezug auf die DDR, die wir nicht einverleiben wollen, sondern das gilt ganz generell.
Translation:
We agreed that there is no intention to expand NATO's defensive area to the east. This does not only apply to the GDR, which we do not want to include, but in general.
It must be said here that this is the personal position of the German Foreign Minister in a complex historical and political situation. And that he said this as a German minister and not as a NATO official. Especially in the context of the fact that the NATO alliance, with the unification of the two Germanys, will expand to the East.
2.
Transcript of a part of the February 9, 1990 conversation between U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev.
Baker: I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?
Gorbachev: We will think everything over. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.
Baker: We agree with that.
Gorbachev: It is quite possible that in the situation as it is forming right now, the
presence of American troops can play a containing role. It is possible that we should think together, as you said, about the fact that a united Germany could look for ways to rearm and create a new Wehrmacht, as happened after Versailles. Indeed, if Germany is outside the European structures, history could repeat itself. The technological and industrial potential allows Germany to do this. If it will exist within the framework of European structures this process could be prevented. All of this needs to be thought over.
In that conversation, Baker also mentions the initiation of the "2+4" process:
With the French and the Germans we have initiated a preliminary discussion of the possibility of creating a "two + four" mechanism, without aiming at an agreement yet.
This shows us that all these statements, both Genscher and Baker's, were part of bilateral talks and that they were made before the start of the "2+4" process described above. They should be taken in the context of talks about the future of a united Germany, the caution of the countries that divided Germany at the end of World War II (USA, UK, France, Soviet Union) about the future and the economic, political and thus potentially armed power of a united Germany. The Soviet Union agreed to the entry of the whole of a united Germany into the NATO alliance after receiving very favorable and large amounts of financial support.
3.
At
the German-Soviet meeting held in Moscow on July 15, 1990. Gorbachev, in talks with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, pointed out that the Soviet Union was not ready to give consent to the expansion of the NATO alliance into the territory of East Germany and that NATO forces should not be present in this area. Kohl agreed. The next day, a
treaty of German sovereignty was signed.
4.
Occasionally, the speech of the then NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner is also mentioned in the context of the non-expansion of the NATO alliance to the East. His entire speech is available at this
link. It mentions the entry of a united Germany into
the NATO alliance because Germany's neutrality is not a solution. Werner explicitly states that the NATO alliance is ready and will
not position its armed forces outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. That is, that they will not be deployed to the territory of the former East Germany.
Conclusion:
The arguments put forward by those who claim that NATO promised not to expand to Eastern Europe, that it deceived Russia, that is, the Soviet Union, and that Putim has the right to be dissatisfied because the West does not keep its promise, are not. These are untruths. This is twisting the facts and putting them in a completely wrong context. The facts, especially when put in the context of time and space and processes and events, are clear: there was NO promise that NATO would not expand to the east of Europe compared to the countries that were then members of the Warsaw Alliance. What was promised, NATO continues to stick to it. Mentions that NATO made a decision in 1993 that allowed membership to be extended to the countries that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union are also not justified. Namely, with the disintegration of the Warsaw Union and the Soviet Union into a large number of states that restored their political and state sovereignty, there was a change in political relations. This change is recognized by the agreement that the Russian Federation signed with NATO in 1997, which we mention in this study. Therefore, there is not a word about any form of fraud taking place. What was promised and signed at that time is still valid.
Therefore, all statements and publications that claim that NATO deceived Russia and will not accept the countries created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union (because that was not the question at the time), are untrue and lead readers not to make completely wrong conclusions that, especially in such situations, can significantly (and negatively) affect the internal stability of individual states. the spread of distrust in NATO as an organization and the defense capabilities of NATO allies at the individual level as well as the Alliance in general.
Assoc. Prof. Prof. Dr. Sc. Gordan Akrap