On May 2, 2025, Jutarnji list reported, via the website of the Sarajevo daily newspaper Oslobođenje, an analysis by the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) concerning the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [1][2][3].

We highlight two paragraphs from the IFIMES analysis:

1. “The statement by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković (HDZ) that the Republic of Croatia will not impose sanctions on the president of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik (SNSD), represents the strongest blow to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) since December 1991, when in Zagreb a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) against Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, aiming to create the entity ‘Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (HR–HB)’ as a future constituent part of the Republic of Croatia.”

2. “All states that believe they can implement Greater State concepts should look at the fate of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman and how their policies fared in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

1. In December 1991, a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) targeting Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in Zagreb.

2. The policies of Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were equally examples of attempts to realize a greater state concept.

3. The Republic of Croatia will not impose sanctions on the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik.

4. Croatia constantly plans and conducts attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Did Andrej Plenković hold a secret meeting with Milorad Dodik?

6. Is Turkey a serious partner of the EU, and does it have “particularly well-developed ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Qatar, and even the UAE”?

7. Is there a U.S. plan according to which Turkey acts as the “guardian of the Balkan borders and protector of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty”?

8. Have Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo signed a “military alliance”?; Does that document represent an “undermining of the instability in Serbia and Hungary, as well as an attempt to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina”? Is the policy of the Republic of Croatia “underhanded and secretive,” and does it “drag NATO into a possible regional conflict”?

9. Is Croatia secretly arming itself to enter into conflict with Hungary due to fears of political ties between Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump, as well as Vladimir Putin?

10. Has the Prime Minister of Croatia, A. Plenković, performed a “salto mortale” by signing an agreement with Kosovo and Albania in order to “prevent the normalization of relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and to block a trilateral agreement led by the U.S.”?

Ad. 1. In December 1991, a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) targeting Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in Zagreb.

An important detail in the analysis of this case is the English term established, which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) translates into the “Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian” (BCS) language version as uspostavljen and uses in a strictly defined criminal law context referring to the formal establishment of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE). In its analysis, the IFIMES Institute uses the term ustanovljen. It is unclear whether this is their own translation of established, or if they deliberately use a different term from the ICTY in order to place the beginning of the JCE in a broader, informal context, starting in December 1991, when certain political and military talks took place in which the actors expressed certain beliefs that, according to the ICTY, imply the objectives of the later JCE. However, this is not sufficient for a legal qualification that the JCE was already established at that time.

If the authors believe that the JCE can be considered as established as early as December 1991, due to actions such as political and military meetings that may have laid the groundwork for achieving its goals—which would later be formalized through the JCE—then this reflects the opinion of the authors rather than a conclusion of the ICTY. Formally, preparations for establishment are not the same as establishment itself; that is, there is a distinction between political strategy and criminal responsibility as a consequence of the implementation of that strategy.

In the appeals judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case of Prlić et al., paragraph 783 states:

“The Trial Chamber concluded that as of December 1991, the leaders of the HZ(R) H-B, including Boban, and leaders of Croatia, including Tudman, believed that in order to achieve the Ultimate Purpose of the JCE, it was necessary to change the ethnic make-up of the territories claimed to form part of the HZ H_B. The Trial Chamber also found that from no later than October 1992, Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, and Petkovic knew that the implementation of the Ultimate Purpose of the JCE ran counter to the peace negotiations being conducted in Geneva and would involve the Muslim population moving outside the territory of the HZ H_B.”【4】

This part of the judgment refers to possible preparations for the implementation of the JCE as early as December 1991, not that the JCE was established in December 1991. This becomes clearer when the remainder of paragraph 783 is read:

“The Trial Chamber then concluded that the evidence demonstrated that from mid-January 1993, the leaders of the HVO and certain Croatian leaders aimed to consolidate HVO control over Provinces 3, 8, and 10, and to eliminate all Muslim resistance within these provinces and to "ethnically cleanse" the Muslims so that the provinces would become in "majority or nearly exclusively Croatian". It thus found that a JCE was established to implement the Ultimate Purpose of the JCE from at least as early as mid-January 1993, the common criminal plan of which was "domination by the HR H-B Croats through ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population" (the "Common Criminal Plan" or "CCP).”

From this paragraph of the appeal judgment, it is evident that, according to the ICTY, the JCE (Joint Criminal Enterprise) was not established in December 1991, but rather from mid-January 1993, and it was not directed against Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole but against three out of ten provinces within Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, ten provinces were envisioned within Bosnia and Herzegovina [5]. Moreover, Article 842 of the appeal judgment states that “The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber expressly found that the JCE only came into being in mid-January 1993, as the evidence was insufficient to establish its existence at an earlier stage” [6]. The relationship between the JCE and the criminal purpose is that “responsibility for a JCE requires the existence of a ‘common plan, intent or purpose’ which represents or involves the commission of a crime” [7].

Accordingly, the verification of this claim can be divided into two parts.

1. If the authors of the analysis were referring to the formal establishment of the JCE (Joint Criminal Enterprise) as a legal entity, then the claim is doubly incorrect because, according to the ICTY:

a) it was established in mid-January 1993, not in December 1991,

b) it was established over three provinces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not throughout the entire country.

2. If the authors of the analysis provided their own, non-judicial interpretation of the beginning of the JCE’s establishment, then the claim is not false but rather vaguely and imprecisely worded, and inconsistent with the judgment to which the authors refer. As a result, such phrasing may lead to erroneous conclusions.

Ad. 2. The policies of Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were equally examples of attempts to realize a greater state concept.

The sentence about the fate of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman and their respective policies suggests their equivalence, or at least similarity, or at least some points of contact in the sense that both attempted to realize expansionist state policies at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and both failed. However, such an equation finds no support either in the conclusions of the ICTY or in historical facts. Regarding Franjo Tuđman (as well as Gojko Šušak and Janko Bobetko), the ICTY found:

„In addition, the Appeals Chamber emphasises that findings of criminal responsibility made in a case before the Tribunal are binding only on the accused in a specific case. In this regard, Appeals Chamber observes that the Three Croatian Oftlcials were not indicted or charged in the present case. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber made no explicit findings concerning their participation in the JCE and did not find them guilty of any crimes. Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's findings regarding the mere existence and membership of the lCE do not - and cannot - constitute findings of criminal responsibility on the part of any persons who were not charged and convicted in this case. Thus, the Trial Judgement is binding only on the Six Accused, and the presumption of innocence of the Three Croatian Officials is not impacted. The Appeals Chamber further observes that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is restricted to "natural persons" and the Tribunal does not have the competency to make findings on state responsibility. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber emphasises that the findings in the Trial Judgement regarding the Three Croatian Officials in no way constitute findings of responsibility on the part of the state of Croatia. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds Croatia's submissions to be without merit and dismisses them.“[8]

Historically speaking, Slobodan Milošević's policy attempted to create a Greater Serbia on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, during which Serbian forces at one point controlled 70% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory [9][10]. Franjo Tuđman's policy defeated Milošević's strategy, with the key moment being the military operations in 1995, when Croatian and Bosniak-Muslim forces jointly defeated the Bosnian Serb forces, thereby preventing the realization of Milošević's goals and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina within the borders it had before 1991.  Therefore, there is neither equivalence nor similarity nor any point of contact between the policies of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. These policies are entirely different in both objectives and approaches, which is why the claim that equates them is incorrect and lacks any basis in facts.

Ad. 3. The Republic of Croatia will not impose sanctions on the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik.

According to current information, the United States has imposed sanctions on certain individuals in the Republic of Srpska. As for the EU, some countries have introduced specific sanctions against targeted individuals from the political sphere of the Republic of Srpska. It is clearly evident that there is no consensus within the EU regarding the necessity of imposing sanctions, their nature, or against whom they should be directed, due to the complexity of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Making such claims demonstrates a lack of understanding of the functioning and decision-making processes within the EU. Specifically, sanctions related to foreign policy and security are not implemented independently by each EU member state but are enacted jointly, requiring a unanimous decision by all member states, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Currently, among EU member states, only Germay and Austria have imposed sanctions (entry bans and asset freezes within their respective territories) on individuals from the Republic of Srpska.

This claim is one of a series of assertions in this paper aimed at imposing a general conclusion that the Republic of Croatia poses a serious threat to the stability and security of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s existence as a subject of international law, as well as to the lives of Bosniaks.

Ad. 4. Croatia constantly plans and conducts attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When making such very serious claims, the author of the analysis should provide sources and examples. That is not the case here, even though the authors state at the beginning that this is only a part of what is included in a "comprehensive analysis." The Republic of Croatia neither plans nor carries out attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia invests signficant resources in BiH. Croatia is committed to the sustainable and lasting stability and security of BiH, as well as to the protection of the full constitutional rights  and equallity of Croats in BiH as one of the three equal, sovereign, and constituent peoples in the country, and to the "acceleration of BiH’s European path." Croatia supports a "structured dialogue" and encourges de-escallation, reduction of tensions, deradicalization of public discourse, and calls for open communication in order to resolve numerous outstanding issues through sincere dialogue. Croatia and BiH have deeply interconnected economies that would suffer great harm from any destabilization, imposition of conflicts, or warfare.

Therefore, without evidence, the claim that Croatia is constantly planning and carrying out attacks on BiH cannot be accepted as true.

Ad. 5. Did Andrej Plenković hold a secret meeting with Milorad Dodik?

The authors of this analysis, as an additional argument in support of their claims that Croatia represents a structural threat to the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cite a piece of information which they themselves describe as alleged. As a rule, fact-checkers should not be guided by the verification of such statements, as they are difficult to verify. We mention it here in the context of assessing the overall credibility and relevance of this source and their analyses. Placing such a claim in the context of other inaccuracies presented in this document, this hypothetical statement further contributes to the assertion that analyses published by this organization and these experts require thorough and serious verification before any publication. This is also confirmed by officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their public statements.

Ad. 6. Is Turkey a serious partner of the EU, and does it have “particularly well-developed ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Qatar, and even the UAE”?

A particular point of interest is the frequent mention of the Republic of Turkey in this, as well as in other IFIMES analyses. Turkey is a very serious player on the international political stage. Its leadership is attempting to exert even greater and stronger influence in Central Asia, the Middle East, and especially in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions. However, this position should not be exaggerated. The relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia is very complex and demanding, and it cannot be said that the two countries have particularly strong ties.  

Ad. 7. Is there a U.S. plan according to which Turkey acts as the “guardian of the Balkan borders and protector of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty”?

Currently, there is no available information about the existence or even the announcement of any such plan. There are proposals coming from certain circles of Bosniak political representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly those connected with Turkey, who emphasize the potential influence of Turkey in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The only publicly available document our team has found is yet another analysis by IFIMES. From this example, it is possible that this involves self-citation — that is, referencing claims the authors themselves made in other documents, which are then presented as facts without citing their actual sources. Therefore, this claim is very difficult to verify, which adds an additional problem regarding the credibility of the authors and their work.

Ad. 8. Are the following claims true:

a) Have Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo signed a “military alliance”?

b) Does this document represent “an undermining of the stability of Serbia, Hungary, as well as an attempt to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina”?

c) Is the policy of the Republic of Croatia “malicious and underhanded” and is it “dragging NATO into a potential regional conflict”?

The Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Albania, and the Republic of Kosovo signed a Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Defense and Security in Tirana on March 18, 2025. This Declaration does not speak, either directly or indirectly, about forming a military alliance between the signatory countries, nor does it pose a threat to any state. The Declaration was made publicly available within less than 48 hours of its signing.

The authors claim that Croatia is drawing NATO into a potential regional conflict, while failing to mention that Albania is also a NATO ally, having joined the alliance together with the Republic of Croatia, and that the largest NATO military base in southern Europe is located in Kosovo.

This Declaration does not represent a threat to any country, nor does it drag the NATO alliance into any kind of conflict. Therefore, these claims should be viewed in the broader context of examining the true intentions of the authors of this analysis.

Ad. 9. Croatia is secretly arming itself

The plan and process of procuring weapons and combat equipment by the Republic of Croatia is highly transparent. Croatia is an ally within the NATO alliance and a part of the EU’s defense structures. Croatia has no need for any secret procurements, as everything it purchases is done within the framework of its stated needs, based on assessments by the competent professionals within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia. The processes, as well as their outcomes, are known to all within NATO and the EU who need to be informed about them. This is evident from publicly available data. Croatia is systematically working on the balanced development of its capabilities across all branches and functional commands of its armed forces. Therefore, there is no talk of secret arms procurement, especially not of procurement in the context suggested by the authors of this analysis as the reason behind it. Hence, this is yet another incorrect claim that may point to the true intentions of the authors of the analyzed document.

Ad. 10. Has the Prime Minister of Croatia, A. Plenković, performed a “salto mortale” by signing an agreement with Kosovo and Albania in order to “prevent the normalization of relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and to block a trilateral agreement led by the U.S.”?

Based on the responses to the previously mentioned claims that we examined, it is clearly evident that there is no such thing as a trilateral agreement led by the United States. The use of the term "Salto mortale" in a figurative sense signifies a fateful reversal, an unusual or extraordinary undertaking, or a desperate move.

Considering that Croatia continuously develops allied relations with all NATO allies and seeks to foster good, developmental, positive, and quality relations and cooperation with the countries encompassed by the term Western Balkans 6 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania), three of which are NATO allies, the use of the term "Salto mortale“ reflects a lack of understanding of the foreign and security policy of the Republic of Croatia.

At the same time, this claim is inconsistent with other assertions in this analysis, which describe Croatian policy as one that supports Serbia and Dodik in his attempt to secede the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Claims contained within the same text that are contradictory in cause and effect point either to ignorance, inconsistency, or possible attempts to manipulate the informational content being published.

According to the Croatian language portal, credibility is a quality of someone or something that is trustworthy. Claims made by credible sources of information do not provoke doubt and are worthy of the trust placed in them. Synonyms and similar terms include: truthful, valid, authentic, objective, reliable, impartial, clear, consistent, convincing, verifiable, and authoritative.

Therefore, we proceeded to collect data and information about IFIMES and the individual who presents himself as its president, Zijad Bećirević. In the preparation of this text, we used publicly available data, which we attempted to verify through multiple mutually independent sources. In the collection and analysis of data and information, we used the following available tools and sources:

• Chat GPT

• Metricon

• Turnitin

• Publicly available media

• The journal published by IFIMES

• Paid access to data held by institutions of the Republic of Slovenia

The analyses conducted by ChatGPT in accordance with the information verification methodology of the ATENA project will be published on the project's website in their entirety. These analyses have highlighted numerous open questions and revealed inconsistencies in statements and actions. We compared them with our own assessments, which served as the basis for further analysis.

Analyses such as the one by IFIMES, which present serious accusations (political, social, security-related, and ethnic), must, in order to be credible, be supported by trustworthy and relevant evidence clearly stated. However, such indicators, which would allow for additional verification, are lacking in their analyses. The language used is accusatory and tendentious, aiming to appeal to emotions rather than the reader’s rational judgment. It poorly conceals a bias toward two political options while readily accusing their opponents of numerous illegal and harmful activities. Such analyses lack scientific rigor.

On May 4, 2025, we received financial data from the "Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services" – AJPES regarding the entity named Institute IFIMES, registration number 1714619000, tax number SI93592132, located at Vošnjakova ulica 1, 1000 Ljubljana. Their email address is ifimes@ifimes.org (a PDF version of the document is attached on the website www.iihs.hr). The listed legal representatives of the entity are Zijad Bećirović and Aljaf Bakhatyar, both acting as directors. In addition to them, Mirko Pejanović from Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is also mentioned as a founder. IFIMES holds a bank account at NLB d.d., account number SI56020100091078989. The institute does not employ any staff.

As previously stated, Zijad Bećirović is mentioned as the founder and director of the IFIMES institute. Of particular interest is the variation in academic titles associated with his name. Below is a chronological overview of publicly available information regarding the process by which Zijad Bećirović acquired his academic qualifications:

1. On December 20, 2016, RTV Slovenia published a news report stating that Zijad Bećirović's doctoral thesis was rejected for the second time at the Faculty of Social Sciences (https://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/) because it did not meet academic standards. Journalists noted that Bećirović would file a lawsuit with the competent court against the Faculty's decision. They also highlighted that Bećirović first enrolled in the doctoral program back in 2003. The thesis topic is: Communicological Dimensions of Relations Between Islam and Judaism. The same source mentions that a study commissioned by the Municipality of Koper from IFIMES was a case of plagiarism. It was also stated that “in December of last year (2015), he earned a doctorate somewhere in the Balkans.” The Municipality of Koper commissioned six studies for which it paid approximately €80,000, most of which, according to journalists, are plagiarized and unnecessary in terms of content.

2. On October 9, 2018, he gave an interview titled “Nevertheless, One Man Named Željko Komšić, a Croat from Sarajevo, Defeated the Entire Croatian State Leadership and the Fascist Part of the Republic of Croatia.” He signed the interview using the title assistant professor.

3. On December 12, 2019, he gave an interview on the website of the Russian journal The International Affairs, signing as Assoc. Prof. Ph. D. Zijad Bećirović.

4. In October 2020, in issue Vol. 11, No. 2 of the journal European Perspectives (published by IFIMES), Zijad Bećirović signed his article as Associate Professor Zijad Bećirović. This indicates that the signature could not have been the result of an error by another author, editor, or publisher.

5. In early 2022, in a journal of Megatrend University (Serbia), he is listed as assistant professor (on page 4, as a member of the editorial board from abroad).

6. On September 25, 2023, the website of the New University in Slovenia announced that Zijad Bećirović would publicly defend his topic of doctoral dissertation two days later, titled: Cultural, Religious, and Communicological Dimensions of International Relations.

7. In October 2024, he wrote the foreword for a conference proceedings volume titled Dan je vska na novo stkan, where he signed as: Dr. Zijad Bećirović, Associate Professor of Intercultural Communication, Director of the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES), Ljubljana.

8. As a participant at the Belgrade Economic Forum, held in Belgrade from October 29–30, 2024, he signed as Assoc. Prof. Ph. D. Zijad Bećirović.

9. On December 2, 2024, the website of the New University stated that he would defend the dissertation proposal titled: Cultural and Religious Dimensions of International Relations with Emphasis on Islam and Judaism.

10. He is listed as a member of the academic community at Futurale College in Canada (with offices in Spain, Benin, France, and Turkey), where he is referred to as a Doctor of Science.

Several websites list his biography . Although it is repeatedly mentioned that he holds a PhD in economic sciences, there is no information anywhere about the faculty or university where he obtained this degree.

Based on the facts and information above, it is reasonable to ask: did Zijad Bećirović truly earn a doctorate, and if so, where, when, and on what topic? Namely, too many times over the past decade, differing information has been published publicly, causing confusion. Additionally, his doctoral dissertation cannot be found in any publicly accessible repositories of doctoral theses.

Particular attention should be given to reports from the New University in Slovenia, according to which Zijad Bećirović is yet to earn a doctorate on a topic very similar to the one he attempted about ten years ago, when his work was rejected twice.

Montenegrin DFC, a fact-checking organization in Montenegro, published a detailed analysis on June 5, 2020, regarding the publications of the IFIMES institute up to that point.

They noted “a series of inconsistencies and claims that change from year to year.” In their view, a shift in the position and narrative promoted by IFIMES and Bećirović in their analyses and public appearances toward Serbia and Aleksandar Vučić occurred after his meeting with President Vučić held in February 2019. As DFC states:

„Before that meeting, IFIMES's analyses mostly criticized Aleksandar Vučić’s policies, labeling them as successors to those of Milošević and Šešelj, and describing his party as right-wing, conservative, and in many aspects, nationalist. Vučić was portrayed as a factor of regional instability, with his destructive policy based on media control and the creation of crises in neighboring countries. Vučić and Dačić constantly generated problems and crises, positioning themselves as the ones who solve and extinguish these issues, thereby securing for themselves the status of regional leaders.

Vučić is now portrayed as a factor of peace and stability in the Balkans and as someone in the most difficult position. Although previously described as someone whose politics rely on media control, Vučić is now presented as the target of a ‘paid media network.’ The opposition in Serbia, according to IFIMES's analyses, also plays a role in threatening the integrity of the Serbian president, primarily by, as they claim, misusing citizens’ protests and holding meetings with Kosovo-Albanian politicians.“

DFC also provides a visual representation of the analysis of their texts:

 

[1] L. G. International Institute: "This is the strongest Croatian attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 1991!" Jutarnji list, May 2, 2025.

https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/svijet/medunarodni-institut-ovo-je-najjaci-hrvatski-udar-na-bih-od-prosinca-91-15579823 (accessed May 4, 2025).

[2] A. Ša. IFIMES proposes: How to save Bosnia and Herzegovina from Plenković’s words and actions. Oslobođenje.ba, May 2, 2025.

https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/iz-ifimes-a-predlazu-kako-spasiti-bih-od-plenkovicevih-rijeci-i-postupaka-1040673/ (accessed May 4, 2025).

[3] IFIMES. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: Plenković’s Undermining of the Fragile Peace in the Western Balkans? (April 29, 2025).

https://www.ifimes.org/ba/istrazivanja/bosna-i-hercegovina-2025-plenkovicevo-podrivanje-krhkog-mira-na-zapadnom-balkanu/5504 (accessed May 4, 2025).

[4] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case IT-04-74-A, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al. Judgment. Volume II, Article 783.

[5] United Nations Digital Library. Vance-Owen Peace Plan as presented January 1993.

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/705482?v=pdf (accessed May 4, 2025).

[6] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case IT-04-74-A, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al. Judgment. Volume II, Article 842.

[7] United Nations, International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Case Law Database. Common purpose.

https://cld.irmct.org/notions/show/150/common-purpose (accessed May 5, 2025).

[8] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Decision on application by the Republic of Croatia for leave to appear as amicus curiae and to submit amicus curiae brief. Article 9.

https://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/160718.pdf (accessed May 5, 2025).

[9] Phillips, R. Cody. Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995–2004. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005.

https://www.loc.gov/item/2005452181/ (accessed May 5, 2025).

[10] Davor Marijan. Operation Storm. Zagreb: Croatian Memorial-Documentation Center of the Homeland War, 2007.